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The similarities between the stock market crash of 1929 and the
1
recent financial recession are striking. In the wake of the lowest levels
*
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1
See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on
World Trade and the World Economy—An Overview, 41 UCC L. J. 375 (2009) (describing a
crisis of confidence during the recent recession as “[e]veryone ran for the exits at once, short
selling became endemic, and demand for all securities shriveled. The U.S. stock markets
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of investor confidence in recent times, Congress has wrestled with
2
equally historic financial regulatory reform. As bank accounts begin to
recover and stock indices rise, however, public opinion toward our
3
financial infrastructure remains at recession levels.
Congressmen on both sides of the aisle agree that the restoration of
4
consumer confidence is crucial to a meaningful financial recovery.
lost almost $7 trillion in value as Wall Street had its worst year since 1931.”); Jarad D.
Hunter, Comment, “No Crying in Baseball”—And No More Crying On the Stock Markets:
An Alternate-Hybrid Approach to Self-Regulation, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 639, 643 (2005). In
the immediate aftermath of the Crash of 1929, investor confidence was at such a low that
federal intervention, a first in the securities markets, was needed. Id. The Investor
Confidence Index measures the level at 92.1 in August 2010, compared to 86.9 in January
2009, and 135.5 in January 2001. Investor Confidence Index Historical Data, STATE STREET
(2010), http://internet.statestreet.com/industry_insights/investor_confidence_index/historical
data.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). In October 2009, the Financial Trust Index was at 22%.
Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Results: Wave IV, CHI. BOOTH/KELLOGG SCH.
FINANCIAL TRUST INDEX (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.financialtrustindex.org
/resultswave4.htm. See also Mark Gongloff, Alex Frangos & Tom Lauricella, Markets
Swoon on Fears, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article
/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748704901104575423422838391134.html
(“Market
sentiment has soured quickly [as of August 2010]. It underscores just how jittery investors
remain nearly two years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. sent markets
world-wide crashing.”); Peter Wallsten & Eliza Gray, Grim Voter Mood Turns Grimmer,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870490110457
5423674269169684.html (“Nearly two-thirds of Americans believe the economy has yet to
hit bottom, a sharply higher percentage than the 53% who felt that way in January [2010].”).
2
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124. Stat. 1376 (2010). The Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010. Id. See also
Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Congress Nears Financial Rules Reform Milestone, REUTERS, Nov.
30, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3045283120091130 (detailing House
proposals and “measures dealing with the systemic risks from the collapse of large, troubled
financial firms” in committee); Kevin G. Hall, House to Wall St.: ‘Party is Over’, POSTDec.
12,
2009,
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09346/1020450GAZETTE,
84.stm?cmpid=nationworld.xml (describing the House’s passage of the Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, “designed to bring the most sweeping rewrite of
financial regulation since the New Deal era following the Great Depression.”); Marshall
McKay, Financial Reform Passed, Implications Still Unclear, FINANCE & COMMERCE (July
29, 2010, 2:07 PM), http://finance-commerce.com/2010/07/financial-reform-passedimplications-still-unclear/ (detailing passage of the Act); 20 Ways U.S. House, Senate
Financial Reforms Differ, REUTERS, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSN2919483620100106 (detailing markedly different Senate proposals); discussion infra
Part II.A.
3
See Investor Confidence Index Historical Data, supra note 1.
4
See, e.g., Bill Bradley, Op-Ed., Five Ways to Restore Financial Trust, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 19, 2009, at A19 (“Restoring trust in the financial system is the key to solving the
current economic crisis.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Assistant
Secretary Michael Barr on Regulatory Reform to the Exchequer Club (July 15, 2009),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg213.htm (“To rebuild trust in our
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However, Congress’ solution—the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act—fails to adequately address the importance
5
of investor confidence and instead threatens to preserve the status quo.
The status quo—an industry that has betrayed investors’ trust—will not
serve the nation’s interests in restoring investor confidence and in longterm financial recovery.
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter
“SEC”) has proven itself to be largely successful in its oversight of
securities investment professionals, recent missteps in the midst of the
6
financial crisis necessitate organizational change in the regulatory
7
regime. Just as the SEC was born out of the market crash of 1929, this
crisis of confidence calls for a response that actively culls a perception
of a trustworthy and accountable infrastructure; the industry must hold
itself accountable through the increased intermediary oversight
involving self-regulatory organizations.
Self-regulatory organizations (hereinafter “SROs”) set rules
governing member firms in the financial industry and provide oversight,
8
supplementing that of the SEC. SROs report to the SEC, which subjects
markets, we need strong and consistent regulation and supervision of consumer financial
services and investment markets.”); Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the
President After Regulatory Reform Meeting (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-after-regulatory-reformmeeting (“[T]o rebuild trust in our markets, we must redouble our efforts to promote
openness, transparency and plain language throughout our financial system.”); Press
Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Recovery
Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/ (stating that the goal is to restore honest
markets).
5
See discussion infra Part III.
6
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
7
See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2006) (describing national emergencies as reasons for
regulation); Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785,
787 (2009) (“Indeed, the SEC owes its existence to the stock market crash of 1929 and the
subsequent Great Depression.”); The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) [hereinafter
“SEC”] (describing SEC’s creation as a result of Congressional findings for the need to
restore public confidence following the market crash of 1929).
8
See
About
the
Finanical
Industry
Regulatory
Authority,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Oct, 11, 2010) [hereinafter FINRA]. From
FINRA’s website:
FINRA touches virtually every aspect of the securities business—from
registering and educating industry participants to examining securities firms;
writing rules; enforcing those rules and the federal securities laws; informing
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SRO rules to an approval process. SROs, in one incarnation or another,
10
existed before the SEC and federal regulation of securities. The largest
and most well-known securities SRO today is the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (hereinafter “FINRA”), created in 2007 through
the consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(hereinafter “NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (hereinafter
11
“NYSE”). FINRA provides oversight of member brokerage firms, and
nearly every brokerage firm in the United States is required to be a
12
member.
Although broker-dealers are subject to dual oversight by FINRA

and educating the investing public; providing trade reporting and other industry
utilities; and administering the largest dispute resolution forum for investors and
registered firms. We also perform market regulation under contract for the
major U.S. stock markets, including the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE
Arca, NYSE Amex, The NASDAQ Stock Market and the International
Securities Exchange.
Id. See also Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., About MSRB, MSRB, http://emma.msrb.org
/AboutEMMA/AboutMSRB.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter MSRB]. The
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) “develop[s] rules for broker-dealers and
banks that underwrite, trade and sell municipal securities – bonds, notes and other securities
issued by states, cities, and counties or their agencies to help finance public projects or for
other public purposes.” Id.
9
See Rulemaking Process, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/
FINRARules/RulemakingProcess/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) (“SEC staff reviews the rule
proposal to determine whether it is consistent with the requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC staff may request changes or amendments to the rule
proposal.”); MSRB, supra note 8.
10
See William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction
Among Securities Regulators in the U.S. Marketplace—Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 727, 730 (2004); infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. In the beginning, the
stock exchanges governed themselves with no federal or state government oversight.
Friedman, supra. As part of the regulatory reform after the 1929 market crash, Congress set
in motion legislation to create SRO’s as “full-fledged quasi-governmental entities charged
with enforcing federal securities laws . . . .” Id. See also History, NYSE EURONEXT,
http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1089312755484.html (last visited Oct 11, 2010)
[hereinafter “NYSE”] (tracing the NYSE’s origins to 1792).
11
See FINRA, supra note 8 (“[FINRA] is the largest independent regulator for all
securities firms doing business in the United States. All told, FINRA oversees nearly 4,750
brokerage firms, about 167,000 branch offices and approximately 634,000 registered
securities representatives.”); see also Cory Alpert, Financial Services in the United States
and the United Kingdom: Comparative Approaches to Securities Regulation and Dispute
Resolution, 5 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 75, 77 (2008) (“FINRA is the largest nongovernment regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.”).
12
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2006) (prohibiting a broker-dealer from effecting most
securities transactions unless such broker-dealer is a member of a registered SRO); FINRA,
supra note 8.
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and the SEC, a regulatory gap exists with respect to investment
13
advisers. No SRO exists for investment advisers; the SEC is the only
14
federal regulator vested with oversight authority over them. Investment
advisers have recently come to the forefront of the debate over
investment regulation reform. Any reasonably informed American is
familiar with the Bernie Madoff fraud, which largely took place in his
firm’s investment adviser department and remained undiscovered by the
15
SEC despite numerous and credible warnings. As such, much debate
exists over the future of investment adviser regulation and which
16
agency should be entrusted with that authority. Some call for
17
expanding SEC resources, while others call for the extension of
18
FINRA’s authority to encompass registered investment advisers.
Congress has responded with its passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter “Dodd-Frank
19
Act”). An early version of the House’s Wall Street Reform bill vested
FINRA with regulatory and enforcement authority over investment
20
advisers, but that provision has since been eliminated. Instead, the final
13

See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
15
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
16
See discussion infra Part II; see also Addressing the Need for Comprehensive
Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 7-8 (2009)
(statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/geithner032609.pdf (arguing for
the closing of regulatory gaps); Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation, COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, 2-6 (Nov. 30, 2006), available
at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf [hereinafter
“Interim Report”] (advocating for the creation of a self-regulatory organization for
investment advisers).
17
See discussion infra Part II.C. The SEC itself is one of the most vocal opponents of
this position. See Rich Edson, SEC Gives Wish List of ‘Wish List’ of 42 Changes It Wants in
Securities Law, FOXBUSINESS.COM (July 16, 2009), http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/
markets/industries/government/sec-gives-wish-list--changes-wants-securities-law/.
18
See discussion infra Part II.B. Likewise, FINRA is its own greatest advocate. See
Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets – Part II: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement
of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, FINRA), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Ketchum/P118298 [hereinafter “Ketchum”]
(advocating for FINRA’s oversight authority to encompass investment advisers).
19
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124. Stat. 1376 (2010).
20
See discussion infra Part II.A; see also House Passes Wall Street Reform Legislation,
16 No. 7 MONEY MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSLETTER 2 (2010) (stating that “[t]he
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act had a provision that would have given
14
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Dodd-Frank Act calls for a six-month study regarding the need for
21
enhanced oversight resources for investment advisers. This response is
not a solution; it threatens to return regulation of investment advisers to
the status quo, sidelining critical concerns for investor trust and failing
to respond to calls for real regulatory reform.
This Article addresses the importance of investor trust in the
context of current investment regulatory reform efforts. Part I.A
provides an overview of the securities regulatory framework, focusing
on self-regulatory organizations and the regulation of investment
advisers and broker-dealers. Part I.B discusses the role of trust in
economic transactions and recovery. Part I.C examines the strengths and
weaknesses of SRO and SEC enforcement tools, with particular
emphasis on recent frauds. Part II discusses relevant provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the recent reorganization within the SEC,
and introduces the debate surrounding the expansion of FINRA’s
authority. Finally, Part III discusses the ramifications of the
Congressional response to the crisis. This Article argues for the
extension of FINRA’s oversight authority to encompass the investment
adviser industry so as to restore trust in the securities regulatory
infrastructure, lest investors fail to regain the confidence needed for
long-term financial recovery.
[FINRA] ‘sweeping rule-making authority’” over investment advisers.); Melanie Waddell,
FINRA Provision Deleted from Reform Bill, INVESTMENT ADVISOR (Dec. 11, 2009),
http://www.investmentadvisor.com/News/2009/12/Pages/FINRA-Provision-Deleted-FromReform-Bill.aspx (“The provision that would have given FINRA the authority to inspect and
regulate any investment advisor associated with a broker/dealer was successfully deleted
from the huge financial services reform bill . . . .”); U.S. House Nixes FINRA Regulation of
Advisers, FA NEWS (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.fa-mag.com/fa-news/4902-us-house-nixesfinra-regulation-of-advisors.html (“Legislation that would have empowered self-regulatory
organizations, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, to regulate investment
advisors was defeated . . . .”). Indeed, the Obama administration has pushed for greater
harmonization of the broker-dealer and investment adviser professions, including standards
of care. See generally Nikhil Bhargava, Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: The
Administration’s Plans for the Future of Regulation, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 907 (2009); Arthur
B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. L.
395 (2009). The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to conduct a study regarding the
obligations of brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §913, 124. Stat. 1376, 1824-30 (2010).
The comment period expired on August 30, 2010. Study Regarding Obligations of Brokers,
Dealers, and Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 62,577, 2010 WL 2927949
(July 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/34-62577.pdf.
21
See infra note 124 and accompanying text. The Senate’s working version of the bill
did not include a similar provision vesting FINRA with such authority. See infra note 122
and accompanying text.
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I. STRUCTURE AND ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITIES
MARKET
A. Regulatory Framework of the Industry
Since their inception in 1790, the securities exchanges have had
22
self-governing rules and requirements for listing securities. By the time
the federal government enacted its own securities legislation, there were
23
twenty-one such self-governing exchanges. The Securities Acts
represented a compromise, requiring the registration of all national
exchanges and codifying their self-regulating infrastructure, while
24
vesting the SEC with oversight and enforcement powers.
1. An Overview of Select Securities Industry Regulation
Preceding and alongside the federal government’s foray into
securities and investment regulation, the industry has implemented
25
policing procedures of its own. These self-regulatory procedures—
once voluntary and now mandatory—are designed to protect investors
and ensure fair capital markets, thus mirroring the goals of federal
26
securities laws. Self-regulatory organizations are privately funded
entities, entrusted with quasi-governmental authority, which generally
22
See Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry SelfRegulation As We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1352 (2005); Marianne K. Smythe,
Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws:
Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 480-81 (1984) (“Much of the
governance was done by committees appointed by the governing committee. These included
committees on business conduct, stock list, admission, arrangements, publicity, law, and
arbitration. . . . [T]he NYSE . . . [had] an impressive infrastructure for regulating the
activities of its members.”).
23
See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1352; Smythe, supra note 22, at 480.
24
See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1353 (“[T]he Exchange Act did not
completely overhaul the securities industry’s system of ‘self-regulation.’ In fact, the
Exchange Act codified the self-regulatory structure wanted by these exchanges, but with the
SEC acting as a watch-dog government agency.”); Smythe, supra note 22, at 481 (“The
regulatory structure crafted for the securities industry in 1934 was more a function of
political compromise than of logic.”).
25
See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 400 (2002)
(“[T]he stock exchanges continued to have rulemaking and regulatory authority with respect
to their members, their trading markets and their listed companies.”). Prior to federal
regulation, the stock exchanges were uniformly considered to be “private membership
organizations under state law.” Id.
26
See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)-(h) (2006) (requiring SRO compliance with the Exchange
Act’s rules and regulations to maintain registered status).
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adopt and enforce these rules to govern member firms. SROs count
among their ranks entities like the NYSE and FINRA, the former being
28
one of the first SROs.
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent
29
crisis of confidence, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933,
30
marking the first federal regulation of securities. Shortly after its
31
enactment, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which—in contrast to the Securities Act’s focus on the issuance and
initial registration of securities— regulates the securities industry and
32
the secondary trading of securities. The Securities Exchange Act
created the SEC and vested it with broad authority over the nation’s
securities markets, including the authority to regulate and supervise
33
industry professionals, securities exchanges, and SROs.
In 1940, Congress passed the Investment Company Act in response
to investors’ growing reliance on investment companies for financial
34
management. The Investment Company Act governs the behaviors of

27

See Friedman, supra note 10, at 737-38; FINRA, supra note 8. For a discussion of the
quasi-governmental characteristics of SROs, including FINRA, see generally Andrew J.
Cavo, Note, Weissman v. National Association of Securities Dealers: A Dangerously
Narrow Interpretation of Absolute Immunity for Self-Regulatory Organizations, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 415, 417 (2009).
28
See NYSE, supra note 10; FINRA, supra note 8.
29
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
30
See Michael Duffy, ‘Fraud on the Market’: Judicial Approaches to Causation and
Loss from Securities Nondisclosure in the United States, Canada and Australia, 29 MELB.
U. L. REV. 621, 623 (2005) (“The laws were designed to restore investor confidence in
capital markets by proscribing certain practices and introducing greater levels of
government oversight, particularly through the establishment of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.”); Smythe, supra note 22, at 481 (“[T]he long-standing institutions of selfregulation existed, were still intact, and were forces to be reckoned with in 1934 when
Congress undertook to devise a new and, it was hoped, more effective structure for the
regulation of the securities markets.”); SEC, supra note 7.
31
15 U.S.C. § 78a.
32
See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (regulating “transactions in securities as commonly conducted
upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets”); SEC, supra note 7 (“With this
Act, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Act empowers the
SEC with broad authority over all aspects of the securities industry.”).
33
See 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78z.
34
See Mark S. Vander Broek, The Demand Requirement in Investment Company Act
Shareholder Actions, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1500, 1502-03 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Lasker,
441 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1979)) (“Congress passed the Investment Company Act of 1940 in
response to concern over ‘the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment
companies’. . . . [and] to prevent abuse of the investment company structure . . . .”).
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35

investment companies and requires their registration with the SEC.
Similarly, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 regulates the actions of
36
investment advisers. An investment adviser is defined in the Act as
“any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others . . . or who . . . as part of a regular business, issues or
37
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities . . . .” Those
broker-dealers whose advisory services are solely incidental to their
38
work are exempt from the Act’s investment adviser registration.
The federal securities laws can be said to have simply added an
extra layer of regulation over that provided by the exchanges and SROs.
For instance, the Securities Exchange Act puts the onus on registered
exchanges to adopt rules designed to “‘prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles
of trade,’ and to provide for appropriate discipline of its members for
39
any violations of its own rules or the securities laws.” Although the
SEC has gradually gained more authority over SROs by way of
oversight of their rulemaking and disciplinary proceedings and the
40
ability to autonomously enforce SRO member rules, the federal
35

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(a) (2006) (prescribing registration procedure); 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-21 (prohibiting certain insider loans); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34 (prohibiting certain false
representations).
36
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1-80b-21 (2006).
37
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
38
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
39
Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1353-54 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6)-(7)
(2000)). The Securities Exchange Act initially provided for only “a limited degree of SEC
supervision.” NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULATION § 13.01 (2d ed.
2001). The over-the-counter market is also within the purview of the Securities Exchange
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006).
40
See Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation: Should the New York Stock Exchange
Be Reorganized?, 10/16/2003 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2003); Friedman, supra note 10, at 740-745
(detailing SROs’ transition from relatively autonomous organizations to strictly regulated
quasi-governmental entities following the 1975 Securities Reform Act). The Securities
Reform Act gave “the SEC the power to initiate as well as approve SRO rulemaking,
expanding the SEC’s role in SRO enforcement and discipline, and allowing the SEC to play
an active role in structuring the market.” Karmel at 3. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (granting
the SEC authority to modify SRO rules as it deems necessary); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)-(f)
(granting the SEC authority to review and modify SRO disciplinary actions as it deems
necessary). If an SRO is found not to be in compliance with the provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act, the SEC has authority to: (1) revoke or suspend the SRO’s registration; (2)
commence an administrative proceeding against the SRO, to censure or restrict the
activities, functions, and operations of the organization, a member or an associate; (3)
remove or censure an officer or director; or (4) enjoin the SRO from an activity which has
been determined to violate the Securities Exchange Act. See Friedman, supra note 10, at
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government relies upon the industry’s self-regulation. Rather than
phasing out or replacing SRO authority with federal oversight, SROs
have remained an integral part of the market’s regulatory structure,
recognized by Congress for their “individual commitment to vigilance
41
in the surveillance of securities markets.”
2. Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers
Among the primary functions of SROs is the regulation of brokerdealers, serving as intermediaries between the SEC and regulated
42
members of the industry. A broker is defined as “any person engaged
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
43
others,” and a dealer as “any person engaged in the business of buying
44
and selling securities for such person’s own account.” Many firms
operate as both brokers and dealers. The Securities Exchange Act
requires broker-dealers to register with the SEC and join either a
45
registered national securities exchange or an SRO. Broker-dealers are
statutorily obligated to pay dues to the Securities Investor Protection
46
Corporation, and are further subject to numerous duties, including
suitability, best execution, fair dealing, and the prohibition of excessive
47
markups and churning of customer accounts. Moreover, they are
743 (paraphrasing 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)-(h)).
41
See Friedman, supra note 10, at 739.
42
See FINRA, supra note 8; SEC, supra note 7.
43
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A).
44
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
45
15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . to effect any
transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security . . .
unless such broker or dealer is registered . . . .”). Nearly all U.S. broker-dealers are members
of FINRA. See Interim Report, supra note 16, at 119. The requirement for brokers and
dealers to register as members of a self-regulatory organization was not initially mandated
under the Exchange Act; amendments to the Act in 1938 under the Maloney Act imposed
the requirement, resulting in the formation of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), now FINRA. See 15 U.S.C. §78o-3; Laby, supra note 20, at 402.
46
See 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-lll. The Securities Investor Corporation (“SIPC”) maintains a
fund to reimburse harmed investors as a result of the failure of a member brokerage firm. Id.
47
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-7(a) (2010) (prohibiting churning and charging
excessive fees); NASD Rule 2310, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638 (imposing the standard of suitability for
customer recommendations); NYSE Rule 405, available at http://rules.nyse.com/
NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_5_7_6&CiRestriction=
405&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/; see also Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 991 F.2d
1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) (delineating a five-part test required to prove a violation of a
broker’s standard of suitability). For an expert discussion of broker-dealer duties, see
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subject to the Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions, as well as financial
48
soundness regulations set by the SEC. Thus, broker-dealers are subject
to layers of rules-based regulation, allowing for both SRO and SEC
oversight and discipline.
SRO jurisdiction is limited to brokers and dealers, leaving a
49
regulatory gap with regard to investment advisers. Investment advisers,
therefore, remain somewhat of an anomaly in the securities regulation
framework, in that they are subject only to either SEC or state oversight
50
pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act. In general, an investment
adviser is required to register with the SEC if he manages more than
51
$100 million in assets. Below that asset threshold, the Investment
Advisers Act precludes federal regulation, allowing the state to assume
52
the responsibility if registration is required at all. Otherwise, the
generally DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION §§ 5:1 – 5:29 (2007).
48
See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (prohibiting any act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security); 17 C.F.R. 240.17a-5(c) (2010)
(requiring filing and disclosure of certain financial statements).
49
See Carolyn W. Mendelson, Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out for My Best
Interests? The Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41, 48 (2009); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (requiring only broker-dealers to maintain SRO membership); Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address Before the New York Financial
Writers’ Association Annual Awards Dinner (June 18, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809mls-2.htm (discussing the disparate
regulatory framework of broker-dealers and investment advisers); Doug Halonen, Madoff
Scandal Spurs SRO Talk, Pensions & Investments, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Jan. 12,
2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20090112/PRINTSUB/901109970
(discussing the fact that registered investment advisers are not subject to SRO oversight).
50
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006) (prescribing thresholds for state and federal
registration). Individual and institutional investors alike retain investment advisers to assist
them in the planning of their financial affairs. See Background & Mission, INVESTMENT
ADVISER ASS’N, https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=
BackgroundMission (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (“Today, the IAA consists of more than
475 firms that manage assets for a wide variety of institutional and individual clients,
including pension plans, trusts, investment companies, endowments, foundations, and
corporations.”).
51
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (prohibiting investment advisers from registering with the
SEC unless they manage at least $100 million in assets). As of April 2009, there were
11,257 registered investment advisers. See Inv. Adviser Ass’n. & Nat’l. Regulatory Servs.,
Evolution Revolution 2009: A Profile of the Investment Advisory Profession, INVESTMENT
ADVISER ASS’N, https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/Reports
_and_Brochures/IAA-NRS_Evolution_Revolution_Reports/evolution_revolution_2009.pdf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010). Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the asset threshold was $25 million.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
410, 124 Stat. 1376, 1576-77; Kara Scannell, States Will Be Hedge-Fund Police, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 19, 2010, at C3.
52
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (requiring federal registration unless assets under
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Investment Advisers Act is largely principles-based. That is, the Act’s
prohibition of any registered investment adviser to “employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client,” to
engage in “any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client,” and
53
to engage in principal trades without the client’s consent, relies on the
fact that registered investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty to their
clients. This fiduciary duty imposes subjective requirements on
investment advisers to avoid conflicts of interest with their clients in
54
order to act in their clients’ best interests. As such, an effective
investment adviser undertakes to gain a thorough understanding of the
client’s resources, risk tolerance, and investment goals in order to make
55
appropriate recommendations. Thus, this principles-based framework
permits clients and firms to define the scope of their relationship, in that
clients may consent to existing conflicts of interest with their
56
investment adviser.
B. Trust as an Essential Element of the Economy
Trust can be defined as “the voluntary ceding of control over
management amount to less than $100 million).
53
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6.
54
See Lori A. Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fiduciary Duty: Return to First Principles (Feb. 27, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022706lar.htm; Mendelson, supra note
49, at 48-49. Although the term “fiduciary duty” is not used in the Investment Advisers Act,
courts have found the duty to be inherent. See Mendelson, supra note 49, at 49 (citing SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)). The Supreme Court stated
that:
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition
of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship, as well
as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least expose, all conflicts of interest
which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to
render advice which was not disinterested.
Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191-92. See also Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Brokers,
Critics Spar Over ‘Fiduciary’ Rule, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2010, at C15 (“Fiduciary duty for
investment advisers has never been strictly defined in the law. Court rulings and SEC
enforcement actions have provided guidelines. One is that advisers should provide clear
disclosure so clients can compare advisers’ disciplinary history and pay arrangements.”).
55
See IAA Standards of Practice, INVESTMENT ADVISER ASS’N, https://www.investment
adviser.org/eweb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=StandardsPractice (last visited Oct. 21,
2010) (describing registered investment adviser standards of practice).
56
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (requiring a registered investment adviser to disclose any
conflicts of interest and obtain client consent before making certain transactions in
securities).
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something valuable to another person or entity, based upon one’s faith
in the ability and willingness of that person or entity to care for the
57
valuable thing.” Simply put, trust is having faith and believing in
others. Trust’s corollary, trustworthiness, can be defined as an
“unwillingness to exploit a trusting person’s vulnerability even when
58
external rewards favor doing so.” Trustworthiness is displayed through
an individual or entity’s integrity and fulfillment of assigned
responsibilities.
The concept of trust has always been an essential element of our
59
economy. Research has shown that cooperative, trustworthy behavior
between individuals leads to more of the same behavior and an increase
60
in the perception of trust between the individuals. Research has also
shown that, among individuals, “communications and expressions
directed towards encouraging cooperative behavior lead to greater
61
trustworthiness.” Building on this behavioral foundation, research has
found that on an individual level, trust plays an integral part of
62
63
economic interaction. That is, “[t]rust acts as a lubricant,” enabling
individuals, as investors, to transact efficiently, and thus, more often.
For analogous reasons, the proper organizational regime can similarly
promote trust among individuals. In other words, “[when] people are
64
confident in the [law] to punish cheating, people are more trusting” as
a result of their faith in the monitoring system.

57
Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial ReRegulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2009) (quoting Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93
GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005)). See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 432
(11th ed. 2003) (defining the term “trust” as “assured reliance on the character, ability,
strength, or truth of someone or something.”).
58
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1740 (2001). See also MERRIAMWEBSTER, supra note 57 (defining the term “trustworthy” as “worthy of confidence.”).
59
See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357
(1972); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 596
(2001); Brescia, supra note 57, at 1366 (quoting 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. VII, § 5, at 108-09 (Cosimo 2006) (1848)).
60
See, e.g., Thomas Gautschi, History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations, 12
RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 131 (2000); Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of
Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008);
Brescia, supra note 57, at 1397-1400.
61
Brescia, supra note 57, at 1397.
62
See id. at 1363.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1402.
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These observations have been tested and applied in the context of
financial reform. One general conclusion is that “[j]ust as the level of
trust present in a society generally has a positive impact on growth,
nations that have strong investor protections, and which honor the rule
of law and contract and property rights, tend to have higher rates of
65
economic growth than low trust/weak rule of law nations.” The idea of
trust has been commonly measured by the World Values Survey, which
66
asks citizens of a given country whether they generally trust others. In
his survey of the subject and underlying research, Frank B. Cross details
67
the association between trust and economic growth. Using the World
Values Survey data, Cross established a significant and positive
68
association between trust and economic growth. A similar study
looked at twenty-nine market economies and found a significant and
positive association between trust and both investment and economic
69
growth. Another study found a positive link between high levels of
70
trust and higher economic growth rates. Thus, Cross and others have
found that, to a large extent, “[t]rust itself is critical to economic
71
success,” due to its ability to temper economic uncertainty.
History tells a similar story. It was the public’s loss of trust that
acted as a catalyst for comprehensive securities regulation beyond that
72
provided by the self-regulating arm of the industry. In response to the
rising prevalence of fraud and highly speculative and unfair investments
73
that were unlisted on exchanges, various states enacted “blue-sky”
laws for the purpose of imposing registration requirements on securities
74
and their salesmen. Within just two decades, all but one state had
65

Id. at 1405.
See Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 333,
334-35 (1997).
67
See Cross, supra note 57, at 1475-85.
68
See Cross, supra note 57, at 1479 (citing La Porta, supra note 66, at 334-35).
69
See Cross, supra note 57, at 1478 (citing Stephen Knack & Phillip Keefer, Does
Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997)).
70
See Cross, supra note 57, at 1478 (citing Paul F. Whitely, Economic Growth and
Social Capital, 48 POL. STUD. 443, 444-52, 460 (2000)).
71
See id.
72
See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text; infra note 77 and accompanying text.
73
See LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 7 n.22 (1958); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 353-54
(1991); Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229 (2003).
74
See Mahoney, supra note 73, at 229-231. In 1911, Kansas became the first state to
adopt a statute regulating the sale of securities. Id. The term “blue-sky” is said to have
66
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75

enacted blue-sky laws. The public had come to perceive the exchanges
as untrustworthy, blaming them for facilitating the fraudulent and
speculative investments characteristic of those in the early twentieth
76
century leading up to the market crash of 1929.
Following the crash, the public’s trust in the nation’s securities
77
markets continued to fall precipitously. Small and large investors alike
were wary throughout the ensuing Great Depression of reinvesting any
78
money they had salvaged. As Congress and the Roosevelt
administration explored methods of financial recovery, it became clear
that the public’s confidence in the markets would first have to be
79
restored. The Roosevelt administration’s response included an attempt
80
to garner trust through the use of the Blue Eagle symbol, which sought
81
to symbolize compliance with codes of conduct. The Blue Eagle was
marketed by complying companies across all industries to show
82
consumers that they were trustworthy. Companies that complied with
the requirements of the program were authorized to display a Blue
Eagle decal to their employees and to the public, symbolizing their
devotion to the nation’s recovery and signifying that they were “a
derived from one individual’s disparaging characterization of securities salesmen of the day,
who would sell “building lots in the blue sky.” Id. (quoting LOSS & COWETT, supra note 73,
at 7 n.22). See also Thomas Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37, 37 (1916).
75
See Mahoney, supra note 73, at 229. By 1931, 47 of the 48 existing states had
adopted such laws. Id.
76
See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1353. Congressman Adolph Sabath, on the
floor of the House of Representatives, argued that the securities exchanges:
[B]elieve[d] that it [was] their own privilege and their God-given right to
control this gambling den that brought about destruction to America, brought
about the closing of our banks and manufacturing plants, nearly ruined all of the
insurance companies, brought about the unemployment of 16,000,000 men in
the United States and that caused untold hardships and suffering and, above all,
that was responsible for thousands of suicidal deaths.
Id. (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 7689 (1934)).
77
See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 1. In the immediate aftermath of the Crash of ‘29,
investor confidence was at such a low that federal intervention, a first in the securities
markets, was needed. Id.
78
See SEC, supra note 7; Duffy, supra note 30, at 623 (“During the 1920s
approximately 20 million large and small shareholders purchased securities on the United
States stock market, with some $50 billion in new securities offered during this period.
Following the stock market crash of October 1929, it is estimated that approximately half of
the $50 billion became worthless.”).
79
See Duffy supra note 30, at 623; Hunter, supra note 1, at 643.
80
See Brescia, supra note 57, at 1361-62.
81
See id. at 1361.
82
See id. at 1361-62.
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83

business worthy of consumer trust.” Thus, the Blue Eagle symbol
acted not only to cull the individual consumer’s confidence in the
regulatory system, but to ensure the consumer of the organization’s
84
trustworthiness.
These examples illustrate the predominant role of trust in economic
85
transactions and recovery. Additionally, they convey the importance of
86
analyzing trust via the perception of the individual consumer.
Although the underlying concept is intuitive, it demonstrates our
regulatory framework’s unique potential to reestablish investor
confidence.
C. Investigation and Enforcement
1. SRO Regulatory Tools
The authority granted to FINRA under the Exchange Act allows it
to be an effective intermediary between the SEC and its registered
broker-dealers. While the SEC does not have the general authority to
adopt rules governing the conduct of registered broker-dealers in
87
relation to their customers, FINRA, and other SROs like it, require
their members to adopt rules of conduct and to retain the power to
enforce these rules (and other supervisory policies and procedures)
88
using designated enforcement and examination staff. Among the
requirements FINRA imposes on its members are those which mirror
89
the general anti-fraud prohibitions under the Securities Acts, as well as
90
those which govern treatment of customer accounts. Further, FINRA’s
83

See id. at 1361.
See id. at 1361-62.
85
See discussion supra Part I.B.
86
See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
87
See id. Instead, SROs are required to enforce SEC and SRO rules. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) (2006) (“Every self-regulatory organization shall
comply with the provisions of this title…the rules and regulations thereunder, and its own
rules . . . .”).
88
See e.g., Hunter, supra note 1, at 646-47 (citing About NYSE Regulation, NYSE
EURONEXT, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/1045516499685.html#mktsur (last visited
Oct. 16, 2010)).
89
Compare FINRA Rule 2020, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=6914&element_id=5513&highlight=2020#r691
4 (prohibiting fraudulent and manipulative devices), with SEC General Rules and
Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993) (prohibiting employment of “any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud”).
90
See
FINRA
Rule
2060,
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/
84
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Supervision Rule requires member firms to “establish, implement and
enforce a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve
91
compliance with securities laws and regulations.”
SROs are able to succeed in part because of their unique
investigative and enforcement processes. Within this self-regulatory
regime exists a broad jurisdictional mandate to discipline fraudulent
acts, unethical conduct, the inadequate supervision of accounts, the
failure to maintain books and records, and violations of any provision of
92
the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation pursuant thereto.
Additionally, “virtually any underlying act or omission disciplinable by
93
one SRO is disciplinable by any other SRO.” Because all brokerage
firms belong to at least one SRO, and most belong to several, regulators
have the opportunity to oversee broker-dealers with a fine-tooth comb,
which stands in stark contrast to the SEC’s relatively limited oversight
94
of registered investment advisers. For example, FINRA conducted
approximately 2500 examinations of its 4900 registered broker-dealer
firms in 2008, whereas the SEC conducted fewer than 1500
95
examinations of its 11,300 registered investment advisers in 2007.
Moreover,
these
privately
funded,
quasi-governmental
organizations are not constrained by constitutional mandates to the same
96
extent as the SEC. For instance, although registered broker-dealers
have a duty to cooperate with SRO investigations, they are not entitled

display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8849 (prescribing proper usage of
information obtained in a fiduciary capacity); supra note 47.
91
William Jannace & Anita Moore, Overview of SRO and Broker/Dealer Regulation,
1748 PLI/CORP 31, 38 (2009); see also FINRA Rule 3130, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6286
(requiring annual certification of compliance and supervisory processes).
92
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6)-(7) (requiring SROs to
“prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices [and] to promote just and equitable
principles of trade . . . .”); Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1353-55.
93
Joan F. Berger et al., A Dialogue with Securities Industry—Self-Regulators:
Disciplinary Investigations and Proceedings Conducted by the American Stock Exchange,
the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the New York Stock Exchange, 501
PLI/CORP 359, 361 (1985).
94
See id. at 363 (“SROs have a large common membership, all those subject to SRO
jurisdiction must realize that they are subject to multiple, sometimes co-extensive subject
matter jurisdiction.”).
95
See Ketchum, supra note 18; see also Scannell, supra note 51 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“Over 3,000 investment advisers have never been examined by the SEC.”).
96
See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1356-58 (describing due process obligations
of SROs).
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to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Nor does the commencement of an SRO investigation require a formal
98
order of the kind required by the SEC. Further, despite not possessing
the SEC’s subpoena power, SROs can compel a broker-dealer’s
cooperation in an investigation through a range of available sanctions,
including expulsion, barring employment with a member organization,
99
suspension, or a fine. As such, industry incentives including the
preservation of reputation and avoidance of the imposition of fines have
helped SROs regulate member conduct as effectively as—and with
greater efficiency than—the SEC.
2. Recent Missteps in SEC Enforcement
Despite the SEC’s zeal and overall effectiveness as an enforcement
agency, recent fraud reveals regulatory deficiencies currently facing the
100
securities industry. Two separate, high-profile cases involving
businesses owned by financiers Bernard Madoff and R. Allen Stanford
highlight these deficiencies.
Bernard Madoff was the sole owner of registered broker-dealer and
investment adviser firm Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC
101
(hereinafter “BMIS”). BMIS’ business was comprised of proprietary
102
trading, market making, and investment adviser services. Madoff
conducted the investment adviser wing of BMIS separately from its
other activities, even locating the wing on a different floor of the BMIS
103
office building. From the 1990s until 2008, BMIS operated an
estimated $50 billion Ponzi scheme that paid old clients with the
principal of new clients’ investments in order to give the appearance of
97

See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1356-58 (citing NASD Rule 8221(b),
8310(b); NYSE Disciplinary Rules 476, 477).
98
See Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP, Enforcement by Self-Regulatory
Organizations, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 473,
483 (2007).
99
See Berger et al., supra note 93, at 376-77.
100
The SEC has borne its share of criticism. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, SEC Workers
Investigated for Porn-Surfing, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/02/sec-workers-investigated-for-viewing-porn-atwork/?feat=home_headlines (describing salacious work habits of some libertine SEC
employees).. To be sure, the agency’s daily efforts go relatively unnoticed.
101
See Complaint at 4, United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp.2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(No. 08 Mag. 2735).
102
See id.
103
See id. at 4-5.
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104

legitimate returns. Not a single investment was made, making the
105
entire operation a fraud. In fact, no regulatory agency can take the
credit for cracking the Madoff case—his sons turned him in upon
106
learning of the scheme.
What is probably the most dismaying aspect of the entire scam is
that the SEC had investigated Madoff’s activities eight times during a
period of sixteen years, without ever making an enforcement
107
recommendation. The SEC had been warned on several occasions that
BMIS’ investment advisory arm was producing impossibly favorable
108
results. Further, one SEC staffer had noticed a red flag and warned
superiors of irregularities at BMIS, but was directed to overlook the
109
matter. Because Madoff’s asset management business was registered
as an investment adviser with the SEC, that agency had sole regulatory
jurisdiction over the fraud-perpetrating arm of BMIS under the
110
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. As such, although FINRA had
access to BMIS’ broker-dealer operations, which it had investigated in
104

See id. at 1-2.
See id.; David Ellis, Congress Looks for Answers in Madoff Scandal, CNNMONEY
(Jan. 5, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/05/news/companies/madoff_hearing/index
.htm.
106
See, e.g., David Voreacos & David Glovin, Madoff Turned in by Sons After
Confessing
$50
Billion
Fraud,
BLOOMBERG.COM
(Dec.
12,
2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aDekXqQt6w7o.
107
See Kara Scannell, Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No Avail, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5,
2009, at C1; Bhargava, supra note 20, at 911; Scannell, supra note 51 (“The SEC inspected
Bernard Madoff’s operations several times, and eventually made him register as an
investment adviser, but never figured out he was running a multibillion-dollar Ponzi
scheme.”); see also Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Why Government Regulation Fails, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 20, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045089045751
92430373566758.html (“Financial services regulators failed to enforce laws and regulations
against fraud. Bernie Madoff is the paradigmatic case and the Securities and Exchange
Commission the paradigmatic failed regulator. Fraud is famously difficult to uncover, but as
we now know, not Madoff’s.”).
108
See Bhargava, supra note 20, at 911 (“Investment banker Harry Markopolos had
warned the SEC during the six years prior to BMIS’s collapse that the company was
reporting impossible returns.”); Kara Scannell, Liz Rappaport, & Thomas Catan, SEC
Blasted on Goldman, WALL ST. J., September 23, 2010, at A1.
109
See Zachary Goldfarb, Staffer at SEC Had Warned of Madoff, WASH. POST, July 2,
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR200907010
4223.html. Genevievette Walker-Lightfoot, a staffer in the Office of Compliance
Investigations and Examinations, found irregularities in the firm’s responses to a review she
conducted. Id. Walker-Lightfoot drafted a set of questions to ask the firm, directed at
matters which later turned out to be elements of the fraud. Id. However, the questions were
never asked. Id.
110
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(a) (2006); Bhargava, supra note 20, at 911.
105
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the past, it was statutorily prohibited from concerning itself with BMIS’
111
investment advisory activities. Although it is impossible to know
whether the fraud would have been discovered if FINRA had access to
BMIS’ investment advisory arm, the Madoff scheme raises questions as
to the efficacy of the SEC as the sole regulator of investment advisers.
Within months of the discovery of Madoff’s fraud, the SEC
112
uncovered an unrelated fraud perpetrated by R. Allen Stanford.
Stanford was chairman of the privately held, wholly-owned Stanford
113
Financial Group. In February 2009, the SEC charged Stanford with
fraud, alleging that he promised investors above-market returns on
certificates of deposit issued by the Group’s Stanford International
Bank, all while running a Ponzi scheme which ultimately cheated
114
investors out of $7 billion. Reminiscent of the SEC’s missed
opportunities in the Madoff fraud, it has recently come to light that the
115
SEC similarly overlooked red flags raised by Stanford’s dealings. A
report issued by the SEC’s inspector general states that “SEC examiners
concluded four times between 1997 and 2004 that Mr. Stanford’s
116
businesses were fraudulent, but each time decided not to go further.”
Moreover, in similar fashion to its treatment of the warnings of the
Madoff fraud, the SEC dismissed warnings in 2003 from insiders at the
Stanford Group, as well as warnings in a letter from the NASD—
FINRA’s predecessor—which stated that the “Stanford businesses ‘will
117
destroy the life savings of many.’” The SEC’s alleged investigatory
111
See Rachelle Younglai, FINRA Defends Its Role in Madoff Scandal, REUTERS (Jan.
14, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE50E0EQ20090115; Scannell,
supra note 108 (noting that FINRA maintains that it was statutorily unable to investigate the
BMIS fraud).
112
See Michael R. Crittenden & Kara Scannell, Report Says SEC Missed Many Shots at
Stanford, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052
702303491304575188220570802084.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines.
113
See Kara Scannell, Miguel Bustillo & Evan Perez, SEC Accuses Texas Financier of
‘Massive’ $8 Billion Fraud, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123489015427300943.html.
114
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges R. Allen Stanford,
Stanford International Bank for Multi-Billion Dollar Investment Scheme (Feb. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-26.htm; Crittenden & Scannell,
supra note 112.
115
See Crittenden & Scannell, supra note 112.
116
Id.
117
Id. (citing U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n Office of Inspector Gen., Investigation of the
SEC’s Response to Concerns Regarding Robert Allen Stanford’s Alleged Ponzi Scheme
(Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/oig-526.pdf); see also
Faith Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility: Challenges for the
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lapse thus draws attention to possible institutional shortcomings.
II. FEDERAL REACTION: THE FINRA DEBATE
In response to the crisis, scandals, and subsequent plunge in
investor confidence, and fueled by the Administration’s anti-Wall Street
118
rhetoric, the wheels of Congress have turned. Legislation aiming to
reform the financial services industry has been passed and signed into
law. Although the legislation addresses the future of investment adviser
regulation, Congress’ response is tepid, at best.
A. Legislation and the SEC’s Specialized Enforcement Units
In 2009, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was
119
introduced in the House of Representatives. The Act included a
provision that extended FINRA’s oversight authority to investment
120
advisers, similar to that which it exercises over broker-dealers. The
provision’s sponsor, Representative Spencer Baucus, explained that the
provision was intended to close the regulatory gaps exposed during the
Madoff investigation and scandal, because despite visits to BMIS by
both FINRA and the SEC, those agencies examined separate groups of
121
employees and missed a $50 billion Ponzi scheme. Similarly, the
Senate’s working version of the bill required a study that would focus
on the differences between the regulatory practices and effectiveness of
FINRA and the SEC, with an eye toward the possibility of creating an
122
SRO to oversee investment advisers.
Academy, Future Lawyers, and Corporate Law, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817, 832 n.65
(2009) (“The SEC itself has gone on record with the observation that Stanford’s bank
promised improbable, if not impossible returns to investors, which certainly raises questions
about why the SEC did not act sooner.”).
118
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Strassel, Bonfire of the Populists, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704878904575031640091592622.html. In
his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama lambasted “bad behavior on Wall
Street,” “‘selfish’ bankers [and] CEOs who ‘reward’ themselves ‘for failure’.” Id. (Barack
Obama, President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010)).
119
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124. Stat. 1376 (2010).
120
See House Passes Wall Street Reform Legislation, supra note 20 (“The Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act had a provision that would have given [FINRA]
‘sweeping rule-making authority’” over registered investment advisers.).
121
See id.; discussion supra Part I.C.2.
122
See S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 913 (2010). As initially filed, the provision
[Directed] the SEC to conduct a study of the effectiveness of existing legal or
regulatory standards of care for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers for
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However, the aforementioned provisions were eliminated before
123
the Dodd-Frank Act’s passage. Instead, all that remains are provisions
requiring the SEC to study both the investment adviser examinations it
has conducted over the past five years and the extent to which SRO
regulation could result in more frequent investment adviser
124
examinations. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires a study of the SEC’s
125
institutional organization. The study will consider the possibility of
eliminating units within the Commission and whether the SEC’s current
126
level of reliance on SROs is appropriate. Further, included are
provisions that allow the SEC to write new rules imposing an acrossthe-board standard of conduct on brokers, dealers, and investment
127
advisers in their capacities as client representatives. The standard of
conduct would essentially create a fiduciary duty, in that they would
have “to act in the best interest of the customer without regard” to their
128
own financial interest. Although registered investment advisers are
129
already held to a fiduciary standard, such a duty would be new for
130
broker-dealers.
Amidst the legislative debate, the SEC undertook a reorganization
131
of its Division of Enforcement. The Commission established five
specialized units—Asset Management, Market Abuse, Structured and
New Products, Foreign Corrupt Practices, and Municipal Securities and
providing personalized investment advice and recommendations about
securities to retail customers imposed by the SEC and FINRA, and whether
there are legal or regulatory gaps or overlap in legal or regulatory standards in
the protection of retail customers. The section also requires the SEC to issue a
report within one year that considers public input. If the study identifies any
gaps or overlap in the legal or regulatory standards in the protection of retail
customers relating to the standards of care for brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers, the SEC shall commence a rulemaking within two years to address
such regulatory gaps and overlap that can be addressed by rule.
S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 105 (2010).
123
See House Passes Wall Street Reform Legislation, supra note 20.
124
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 914(a)
125
Id. at § 967(a).
126
See id.
127
Id. at § 913(f)-(g).
128
Id. at § 913(g).
129
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006) (prescribing fiduciary duties of IAs owed to clients).
130
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006) (prescribing registration requirements and standards of
conduct for brokers, which currently do not include fiduciary duties).
131
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit
Chiefs and Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-5.htm.
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132

Public Pensions—and created a new Office of Market Intelligence.
The goal of these specialized units is to make investigations more
targeted and efficient, while the Office of Market Intelligence is tasked
with monitoring, collecting, and analyzing referrals and tips received by
133
the SEC. This comprehensive reorganization, nothing short of a
reaction to the Madoff and Stanford scandals, is an attempt to fill the
gaps in federal investment adviser oversight.
B. Support for FINRA’s Role
FINRA has lobbied extensively for the authority to oversee
134
investment advisers. It points to the fact that the current system
regulates financial professionals who effectively perform many of the
135
same services pursuant to inconsistent standards. It further cites the
fact that its Board of Governors is comprised of a majority of non136
industry representatives, thus distancing itself from claims that its
interests are too closely aligned with those of the industry professionals
it would attempt to oversee. FINRA argues that its position as the first
line of defense for customers of broker-dealers would also allow it to
137
fulfill that role for customers of investment advisers. Specifically,
FINRA argues that consistent and frequent exams are needed to effect
proper oversight of all financial professionals, which the SEC simply
cannot provide, and has not provided, in light of the disparate ratio of

132

See id.
See id. (“These units and the new office will help provide the additional structure,
resources, and expertise necessary for enforcement staff to keep pace with ever-changing
markets and more comprehensively investigate cases involving complex products, markets,
regulatory regimes, practices and transactions.”).
134
See Ketchum, supra note 18. Specifically, FINRA has advocated for the following
protections:
[E]very person who provides financial advice and sells a financial product
should be tested, qualified and licensed; the advertising for financial products
and services should be subject to requirements that it is not misleading; every
product marketed to a particular investor is appropriate for recommendation to
that investor; and there should be full and comprehensive disclosure for the
services and products being marketed.
Id.
135
See id. (“Our current system of financial regulation leads to an environment where
investors are left without consistent and effective protections when dealing with financial
professionals.”).
136
See id.
137
See id.
133
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registered investment advisers to SEC staff examiners. Finally,
FINRA highlights its statutory inability to have examined BMIS’
investment advisory arm under the current regulatory regime, which, it
has said, allowed BMIS to “cynically game the system . . . at great harm
139
to investors.” In sum, FINRA contends that allowing for combined
broker-dealer and investment adviser oversight authority would give the
140
regulator “a complete picture of the business,” ultimately benefitting
the investor.
Support for FINRA’s investment adviser oversight authority also
exists elsewhere. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has recognized that
there is no functional difference between professional investment
141
adviser and broker-dealer operations and services. Similarly, a widelycited study, the “RAND Report,” concluded that despite the stark
regulatory contrast between investment advisers and broker-dealers, the
typical investor does not understand the difference between the two
142
professions. Most telling, the study reported that investors felt that
138

See id. Ketchum stated:
Consider the contrast: FINRA oversees nearly 4,900 broker-dealer firms and
conducts approximately 2,500 regular exams each year. The SEC oversees more
than 11,000 investment advisers, but in 2007 conducted fewer than 1,500 exams
of those firms. The SEC has said recently that in some cases, a decade could
pass without an examination of an investment adviser firm.

Id.
139

Id.
Ketchum, supra note 18.
141
See Schapiro, supra note 49 (discussing broker-dealers’ and investment advisers’
convergence of practice); see also Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n,
Speech at the Manual Fund Directors Forum Ninth Annual Policy Conference: Regulating
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: Demarcation or Harmonization? (May 5, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch050509ebw.htm (stating that
investment advisers and broker-dealers “provide practically indistinguishable services to
retail investors.”).
142
See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND REPORT: INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENTS AND BROKER-DEALERS 14 (2008) (concluding from survey
data that many investors are unaware of the differences between broker-dealers and
investment advisers); see also Richard F. Jackson, James E. Anderson & Andre E. Owens,
SEC Publishes RAND Report on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, WILMERHALE
(Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication
=8226. The RAND Report concluded that:
[R]etail investors generally had difficulty understanding the distinctions
between investment advisers and broker-dealers, including their duties, the titles
they use, the services they offer, and the fees they pay for those services. RAND
also found that investors had difficulty distinguishing between investment
advisers and broker-dealers and understanding the varying affiliations and other
relationships among the different firms.
140
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143

investment advisers and broker-dealers should be similarly regulated.
Proponents view such investor confusion as a compelling rationale for
bringing those industry professionals under the umbrella of one SRO
144
and subjecting them to similar rules and standards. Further,
proponents contend that a rules-based standard of care—one FINRA is
already equipped to enforce—would make enforcement that much
easier, as there would be little need for the interpretation of principlesbased fiduciary standards, and examination methods could be
145
implemented readily and efficiently. Subjecting investment advisers to
requirements similar to those of broker-dealers would necessarily entail
more thorough oversight, including licensing, filing, and recordkeeping
requirements; this would be a positive outcome from an investor
146
protection perspective according to proponents of these changes.
The proposition of subjecting investment advisers to oversight
similar to that governing broker-dealers has received government
approval. In 2008, the Treasury issued the Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure report, which focused on the “rapid and
147
continued convergence” of the broker-dealer and investment adviser
148
professions and the “resulting regulatory confusion” of investors. The
report ultimately recommended the self-regulation of the investment
149
adviser industry similar to that of broker-dealers. The Blueprint
Report cited the cost-effectiveness and potential for enhanced investor

Id.
143

See HUNG ET AL., supra note 142, at 20.
See Jackson et al., supra note 142.
145
See Bhargava, supra note 20, at 908-17 (arguing for the harmonization of brokerdealer and investment adviser standards of care); Interim Report, supra note 16, at 122-25.
146
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006) (prescribing registration requirements and other
obligations of brokers and dealers). In 2008 the Department of Treasury released a report
discussing these issues:
Whereas government regulators are mainly focused on antifraud enforcement,
SROs can adopt and amend industry rules that address a wider range of activity
and professional conduct. As private bodies, SROs may adopt rules and aspire
to standards that extend beyond statutory or regulatory requirements while at
the same time maintaining a flexibility that can help to better protect investors
and encourage innovation in the offering of financial services and products.
DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE
122 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf
[hereinafter BLUEPRINT REPORT].
147
See BLUEPRINT REPORT, supra note 146, at 125.
148
Id.
149
See id. at 125-26.
144
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150

protection as compelling reasons for reform.
Finally, rather than focusing on the perceived benefits of SRO
investment adviser oversight authority, some proponents simply point to
current regulatory deficiencies, including the SEC’s sheer lack of
manpower to effectively oversee its registered investment advisers, as
151
evidence that organizational reform is needed.
C. Criticism of FINRA’s Role
Conversely, the investment adviser industry generally opposes
152
altering the current industry oversight standards and regime. These
organizations primarily argue that FINRA’s rules-based standards are
incompatible with the fiduciary duties inherently owed by registered
153
investment advisers to their customers. These opponents contend that
the fiduciary duty of an investment adviser qualifies as the highest
standard applicable to any financial services professional, thus
154
providing investors with the greatest protections against misconduct.
As such, they assert, other standards of conduct are simply insufficient
155
for an investment adviser’s line of work.
Aside from the insufficiency of a rules-based standard of care,
opponents argue that combining broker-dealer and investment adviser
oversight would further blur the line between the professions, thus
156
doing a disservice to investors by confusing them. Such blurring of the
150

See id. at 126.
See Ketchum, supra note 18.
152
See Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection,
Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance
Office: Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 241 (2009) (statement of David
Tittsworth, Executive Director & Executive Vice President, Investment. Adviser
Association), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
house_hearings&docid=f:55810.pdf [hereinafter “Tittsworth”]; Letter from Daniel J. Barry,
Dir., Fin. Planning Ass’n, to Marcia E. Asquith, Office of the Corporate Sec’y, FINRA,
(June 13, 2008), available at http://www.fpanet.org/docs/assets/7AF3A08D-1D09-67A1AC67E784F6EBD7E6/RN0824Comments.pdf [hereinafter “Financial Planning Association
Letter”].
153
See Tittsworth, supra note 152, at 15 (“[O]bligations of investment advisers cannot
be circumscribed by a rule book no matter how voluminous.”).
154
See id. at 12-14 (arguing instead for a fiduciary duty standard to be applied to
broker-dealers).
155
See id. at 15.
156
See Financial Planning Association Letter, supra note 152, at 2 (stating that the
Financial Planning Association would be “disappointed” with a rule that “would add to this
confusion”).
151
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lines is also undesirable to opponents because it increases the likelihood
that investment advisers will become subject to the same three-tiered
registration requirements and examination jurisdiction beyond what is
currently being advocated, such as additional filing and licensing
requirements and more burdensome electronic record-retention
157
requirements.
Moreover, the investment adviser industry sees FINRA, the most
prominent SRO, as too closely tied to broker-dealers to be able to adapt
158
its oversight capabilities to investment advisers. Representatives of the
industry argue that any commingling of the professions would favor the
broker-dealer framework and require a rewrite of the Investment
Advisers Act, effectively nullifying seventy years of subsequent
159
interpretation. Opponents allege that even if FINRA made a genuine
attempt to accommodate the distinct legal standards demanded by the
160
investment adviser profession, a variety of problems would abound.
For example, conflicts of interest with regard to a broker-dealers’
balancing of customer, self, and representative interests cannot be
161
squared with the duties of investment advisers. Further, opponents
contend that FINRA has limited expertise in assessing the quality of
financial advice, which is a critical skill for the oversight of the
162
profession.
Finally, many opponents see the SEC as a perfectly able regulator
163
plagued by a lack of funding. Opponents point to the SEC’s requisite
expertise and experience in contending that the agency would be wellserved by increasing its resources to match the sheer number of
157

See W. Hardy Callcott & Suneeta Fernandes, Who is a Broker-Dealer, Who is an
Investment Adviser and How is That Likely to Change?, in BROKER-DEALER REGULATION
31ST ANNUAL ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 143, 151 (2009).
158
See Financial Planning Association Letter, supra note 152, at 31.
159
See Tittsworth, supra note 152, at 5 (“[T]he fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act is
well-established and has been applied consistently over the years by courts and the SEC.”).
160
See Financial Planning Association Letter, supra note 152, at 30 (“These drawbacks
include inherent conflicts of interest based on industry funding and influence, questions
regarding transparency, accountability and oversight, due process issues in disciplinary
proceedings, and added cost and bureaucracy.”).
161
See id.; see also discussion infra Part I.A.2.
162
See Financial Planning Association Letter, supra note 152, at 5-6 (“[B]ecause
[FINRA has] no expertise in financial planning . . . they are not qualified to exercise
meaningful supervision.”).
163
See Edson, supra note 17; Tittsworth, supra note 152, at 28 (“The IAA strongly
supports robust and appropriate oversight and regulation of the investment advisory
profession by a fully-funded SEC.”).
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164

registered investment advisers it oversees. As such, opponents of
FINRA have advocated for a restructuring of the SEC, which has been
accomplished by the Commission’s recent creation of specialized units
165
to increase the efficiency of its investigations.
III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE
RESTORATION OF INVESTOR TRUST IN INVESTMENT
ADVISERS
Investor confidence plummeted as a reaction to the recent
166
economic crisis and remains unsettled despite Congressional reforms.
Americans need assurance, by way of meaningful organizational
reform, that regulators and industry professionals understand that the
status quo will not be tolerated. Congress was wrong to remove the
provision granting FINRA authority over registered investment
advisers; FINRA should be delegated that responsibility as part of
broader regulatory reform that increases the role of SROs in general in
order to foster investor trust and establish a more trustworthy industry.
Through this method of reform, greater responsibility would be placed
on SROs and the industry itself to police and assume responsibility for
its own integrity, thereby demonstrating to investors that it is an
industry worthy of investment. Although the SEC’s efforts to bolster its
enforcement division should be applauded, Congress has not
demonstrated genuine concern for restoring investor confidence and has
instead shown that it is content with the status quo.
A. The Investment Adviser Industry Depends on Trust
Just as trust and confidence have been shown to be driving forces
behind economic growth, they are a critical component of our securities
167
infrastructure. In the wake of recent market scandals and fraud,
164

See Tittsworth, supra note 152, at 28-29.
See Letter from David G. Tittsworth, Inv. Adviser Ass’n to The Hon. Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n (Jul. 29, 2009) (on file with Seton Hall
Legislative Journal); see also supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
166
See Investor Confidence Index Historical Data, supra note 1.
167
See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of
the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1082 (2009). Donald Langevoort links the
concept of confidence to the securities industry by explaining the justification for regulation:
From this we may also gain some insight into what we mean by the elusive
phrase ‘investor confidence’ that is so often invoked to justify regulation. On a
near-term basis, investor confidence is a mix of sentiment and risk perception,
165
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investors continue to collectively pull billions of dollars from the U.S.
168
stock market. This behavior departs from the usual trend following a
bear market (i.e. a newly-emerged bull market like the U.S. has been
experiencing since 2009) during which investors have continued to
169
invest, pumping cash into equity stocks. However, investors are
saying that their “enthusiasm about the rally is tempered by uncertainty
170
in Washington [and] on the economy . . . .” That is, investors are not
yet comfortable assigning their trust to—and taking risks in—the U.S.
stock market, providing evidence that the market has lost its
trustworthiness and, in turn, investors’ trust.
Investment advisers hold a particularly important place within the
securities industry as it pertains to maintaining investors’ trust. The
Investment Advisers Act’s fiduciary standard permits investors to
171
expect loyalty from their investment advisers. In other words, the
172
relationship is necessarily one that depends on trust. As articulated by
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout:
[T]he essence of a fiduciary relationship is the legal expectation that

measurable empirically by reference to bid-ask spreads and other cost of capital
measures. Over the longer-term, the test for investor confidence is whether
investors might be inclined to flee the securities markets . . . . Regulation
responds whenever there is a crisis that raises the possibility of such flight.
Id.
168

See Tom Lauricella, Stocks’ Run Draws Yawns From Buyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704706304575107452905427196.
html; Ian Salisbury, Stock Pickers Losing Fans to Index Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100430-711078.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines;
see also Gongloff et al., supra note 1 (describing investors’ return in August 2010 “to the
safe-haven assets they have sought frequently in recent years” despite that, in July 2010,
“stocks and other risky investments were rallying in response to solid corporate profits”).
169
See Chip Brian, Buy Signal Still in Effect for U.S. Markets, Says Kollar, BENZINGA,
(Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.benzinga.com/press-releases/c255334/buy-signal-still-in-effectfor-u-s-markets-says-kollar; Post-Massive Bear Market Rallies, CHARTOFTHEDAY.COM,
(Apr.
17,
2010),
http://beforeitsnews.com/news/33818/Chart_Of_The_Day:_Postmassive_Bear_Market_Rallies.html; Lauricella, supra note 168.
170
Lauricella, supra note 168.
171
See Transamerica Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979); HUNG, ET
AL., supra note 142, at 117 (investment advisers “acknowledged that their business
relationships with clients are built on trust rather than investor understanding of the services
and responsibilities involved and that it is crucial for the financial service industry to
maintain that foundation of trust”). Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On
Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 938
(2006) (arguing that an expectation of loyalty is justified when such a duty is imposed by
law, as in the case of an investment adviser).
172
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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the fiduciary will adopt the other-regarding preference function that
is the hallmark of trustworthy behavior. Moreover, the law
encourages fiduciaries to do this not only or even primarily by
threatening punishment but by framing the relationship between the
fiduciary and her beneficiary as one that calls for a psychological
173
commitment to trustworthy, other-regarding behavior.

Because the fiduciary duty standard imposes subjective
requirements to avoid conflicts of interest with clients and to act in their
best interests, the badge of the relationship is the primacy of the clients’
174
interests, lest regulatory penalties be imposed.
This fiduciary—i.e. trusting—element is what distinguishes the
relationships between other contracting parties in the securities
175
industry. In contrast stands the relationship between broker-dealers
and their customers, which—as a result of compensation practices that
incentivize a broker to trade more often for his customer despite the
customer’s investment objectives—often finds itself wrestling with the
176
interests of the broker versus the customer. However, SROs have in
place strict rules against such broker “churning” of a customer’s
account, as well as rules designed to address other specific conflicts of
177
interest. Thus, SRO presence is crucial to providing rules-based
prohibitions and discipline, in contrast to forcing investors to place what
may amount to blind faith in their investment adviser.
B. Projecting the Right Image to Investors
Despite the extent to which the federal government assumed
control over the markets with the Securities Acts, it notably left the
internal structure intact, thus “set[ting] forth the view that selfregulation was the best first-line defense against unethical or illegal

173

Blair & Stout, supra note 58, at 1743.
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
175
See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 61 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985) (describing a fiduciary’s obligations to beneficiary); Blair & Stout, supra note 58, at
1782-83 (distinguishing fiduciaries from non-fiduciaries in terms of a duty to abandon selfinterest for the sake of one’s client); discussion supra Part I.A.2.
176
See Christopher M. Gorman, Note, Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the
Problems of Insider Trading and Conflicts of Interest in Broker-Dealers? 9 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 481 (2004) (detailing the numerous ways in which a broker’s interests
can be at odds with a customers’.); POSER, supra note 39.
177
See supra note 47.
174
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178

securities practices.” SROs have consistently been perceived as
inherently well-suited regulatory bodies. As recognized by Congress,
SROs are best suited to detect illegal practices due to industry
179
experience and expertise. The goal of organizational reform should be
to “set in place institutional mechanisms that will induce [potential]
180
parties to exchange . . . “ FINRA’s combination of expertise and
enforcement capabilities would fulfill this goal and should be utilized to
display to investors that the industry will hold itself accountable and can
be reformed into being more trustworthy.
Expanding FINRA’s oversight to encompass investment advisers
will send a functionally similar message to the investing public as
181
Roosevelt’s Blue Eagle symbol did to consumers. The striking
similarities between investor confidence and trust in the financial
markets today and during the Great Depression merit similar
organizational restructuring. The securities industry, through scandals
like Bernie Madoff’s investment fraud, has shown itself to be vulnerable
to greed and manipulation. What better opportunity to show to investors
that reform is serious and that their trust is genuinely desired? Only by
restructuring investment adviser oversight to include a self-regulatory
intermediary like FINRA, with its unmatched ability to incentivize
compliance through formal sanctions and reputational harm, can the
industry demonstrate the necessary intent to the public.
Moreover, self-accountability within the industry will better
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Friedman, supra note 10, at 738-39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,256-57 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004)
(describing role of self-regulation in securities). SROs have a relatively infinite amount of
experience regulating the securities industry – the NYSE alone has been doing it for over
two hundred years. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 10, at 738-40; Hunter, supra note 1, at
646-47 (describing history and experience of SROs). James Miller discusses the benefits of
self-regulation where he states that:
[S]elf-regulation directly involves the parties who will generally have the best
institutional knowledge about the need for action and about the efficacy of
various potential actions. Although government can always hire the technical
expertise needed to draft complicated regulations, it will almost always be
slower in perceiving the need for some action than will the participants in the
relevant market.
James C. Miller, The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of SelfRegulation, 4 CATO J. 897, 897 (1985), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
journal/cj4n3/cj4n3-11.pdf.
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NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM AND BEYOND 255 (2d ed. 2006).
181
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
179

KOEBEL (DO NOT DELETE)

92

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

12/6/2010 11:57 AM

Vol. 35:1

incentivize investors to once again invest and begin to trust financial
professionals. The basic principal to be extracted from research linking
trust to economic behavior is that a trustworthy industry begets investor
182
trust and confidence. Our federal securities laws impose fiduciary
duties on investment advisers, but those duties should not appear to be
forced; investment advisory firms can demonstrate their trustworthiness
to investors by submitting themselves to the intra-industry enforcement
of securities laws.
C. Inhibiting Trust
The current investment adviser regulatory regime provides insight
into the shortfall of investor confidence: regulatory black holes exist
that allow some financial professionals to operate virtually under the
183
radar and investors have increasingly fewer reasons, in the wake of the
Madoff, Stanford, and similar scandals, to trust that their investments
are protected and being managed by a true fiduciary. For this reason, the
proper response is not a simple shift in resources and federal
enforcement priorities as a reaction to the scandal du jour. Investors
have weathered the Enrons and Madoffs and see that fraud, in one
incarnation or another, is incentivized in the market; reactionary
policies that address problems ex-post will preserve the status quo and
similarly act as a disincentive to investment.
Expanding SEC resources for the purpose of increasing
enforcement and investigation efforts may very well prevent future
scandals in the securities industry. Efforts to streamline and enhance the
enforcement and investigatory processes should be applauded for
addressing shortcomings and correcting missteps. Further, these efforts
send a powerful message to potential perpetrators regarding federal
regulators’ enforcement priorities. However, taken with the
184
Administration’s anti-Wall Street rhetoric, the signal being sent to
investors is that the industry is one that cannot be trusted and needs to
be coerced to fulfill its statutory duties. A regulatory scheme that
emphasizes SEC rather than SRO protection “precludes any opportunity
for genuine trust and trustworthiness by ensuring that everybody acts
185
under legal coercion.” As such, the social context of the SEC as the
182
183
184
185

See discussion supra Part I.B.
See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118.
Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 573 (2001).
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regulator of investment advisers fails to foster the requisite trust needed
186
to restore investor confidence in their fiduciaries.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without trust in our regulatory regime—rather, without a
trustworthy regulatory regime—investor confidence will wane and
prevent long-term financial recovery. Just as the SEC was born out of
the market crash of 1929, the current crisis of confidence requires a
significant organizational restructuring. By focusing on the role of trust
in economic activity, the critical impact of self-regulatory organizations
on investors’ trust in the securities industry is uncovered. The need for
investors to perceive systemic change and enhanced trustworthiness is
as important as the actual reforms themselves; if investors will not
invest their faith in a troubled industry, we risk being stuck with the
status quo that has failed so many.
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See Blair & Stout, supra note 58, at 1785 (“[T]he key to a successful fiduciary
relationship lies in framing both economic and social conditions so as to encourage the
fiduciary to make a psychological commitment to further her beneficiary’s welfare rather
than her own.”).

